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Intellectual Property (IP) scholarship is generally concerned with how 
innovation policy impacts social welfare by providing appropriate 
incentives for innovation. But lately, the question of who participates in 
IP creation—with an eye to distributive justice as well as social welfare 
more broadly—has been getting more attention. Most scholars writing 
in this vein acknowledge IP’s shortcomings in achieving proportionate 
participation and representation across socioeconomic, race, and 
gender lines. But many argue that in spite of these flaws, IP regimes 
can advance distributive justice by giving the poor and other members 
of disadvantaged groups opportunities to accumulate wealth and 
improve their position in society.  
 
Yet the aspiration some hold out for IP as this particular type of tool for 
distributive justice is, unfortunately, unlikely to be realized, because it 
overlooks how poverty impacts creative decision-making. A large and 
growing body of psychological research shows that poverty changes the 
decision-making of those experiencing it. This Article argues that in 
fact, poverty makes it very difficult to think and act in ways that bring 
about the creative advances meaningful IP participation requires. IP is 
thus inherently limited as a mechanism for escaping poverty.  
  
Poverty’s impact on creative thinking and action also has wide-ranging 
implications for innovation theory and policy that reach beyond specific 
demographic groups. This Article explores how the psychology of 
poverty intersects with IP, and in doing so, makes four main 
contributions to the literature. First, it calls into question the feasibility 
of scholarly calls for IP to act as a mechanism for empowering the poor. 
Second, it offers an additional, novel explanation for why we see lower 
levels of IP participation among socioeconomically disadvantaged 
groups. Third, it argues that IP scholars need to start looking beyond 
incentives in their quest to optimize socially beneficial innovation. 
While IP’s dominant utilitarian theory posits that IP provides needed 
incentives to innovate, what the account fails to consider is the 
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possibility that some otherwise willing participants are unable to 
respond to these incentives. Finally, in offering policy 
recommendations, it turns IP scholars’ current thinking about IP and 
distributive justice on its head. While these scholars argue that IP—a 
mechanism traditionally used to spur innovation—should be used to 
achieve distributive justice, this Article proposes that policies more 
directly aimed at attaining distributive justice will not only be more 
effective, but should also help promote innovation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
If asked why we have Intellectual Property (IP) rights, most people will tell 
you that IP provides needed incentives—to create, to commercialize, to disclose 
creations—that are otherwise lacking for public goods.1 But other accounts of 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the incentive theory); William Fisher, 
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF 
PROPERTY 168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (same); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus 
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IP exist as well.2 One of the more intriguing conceptions of IP envisions it as a 
means of promoting distributive justice.3 While the manners in which IP might 
do so are manifold—by ensuring broad access to the products of intellectual 
labor, for example, or by encouraging technologies that have high social 
value4—one strain of the literature focuses on how IP can promote distributive 
justice by broadening access to IP rights among poor and disadvantaged 
groups.5 
The view that IP rights can and should serve to advance distributive justice 
by giving disempowered groups a tool to take control of their futures has 
intuitive appeal. Economic and social inequality are a matter of growing public 
and political concern,6 and it is nice to think that IP could help remedy some of 
inequality’s more troubling aspects—a kind of meritocratic equalizer to catapult 
talented individuals otherwise held back by society’s inequities up and away 
from their disadvantaged backgrounds. Certain high-profile cases seem to 
bolster the claim: we see an Oprah Winfrey or a Jan Koum, each raised in 
humble circumstances and each now successful with the help of IP regimes,7 
and are tempted to conclude that IP can achieve these outcomes on a larger scale. 
But how realistic is this goal? Is it achievable either in theory or in practice? 
To answer these questions, we need to understand how the conditions of poverty 
interact with the prerequisites for IP participation. If the two are incompatible, 
the case for IP as a tool of distributive justice is weakened, because those we 
hope will benefit from IP will be limited in their ability to do so. Moreover, the 
precise nature of the interaction will tell us what, if anything, we can do about 
it. While some incompatibilities might be remedied by changing IP doctrine or 
procedure, others may be more existential in nature.  
One such potential point of incompatibility arises at the behavioral level. 
Those who study the psychology of poverty know that poverty changes 
                                                                                                                     
Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004) 
(same).  
 2 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 36–38 (2011) 
(describing the Lockean account of IP, according to which intellectual production gives rise 
to natural rights in the products of intellectual labor); Fisher, supra note 1, at 170–71 
(describing the personhood theory of IP, according to which IP rights are granted to protect 
the personhood with which creators imbue their creations). 
 3 Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 259 (2006). 
 4 See Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Agenda for U.S. Patent Law, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 
321, 331–32, 340 (2017).  
 5 See id. at 347–52. 
 6 See Saul Levmore, Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, 113 MICH. L. REV. 833, 
833 (2015) (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)) 
(“Rising inequality in the developed world has become a hot topic.”). 
 7 See Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 555 & n.182 (2016) (arguing that Oprah Winfrey’s repeated 
achievement as one of the wealthiest African Americans in the United States is attributable 
in part to her participation in the “copyright-related industries”).  
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decision-making.8 But the literature has given little attention to how this altered 
thinking impacts creativity. When several strains of empirical evidence are 
considered together, however, one thing becomes clear: circumstances common 
in the lives of the poor impact decision-making in ways that make it more 
difficult to achieve the creative advances meaningful IP participation requires.9 
For instance, when people have experienced the world as harsh and unfair and 
are subject to high levels of environmental stress—conditions disproportionally 
present in poor populations—they are more likely to employ so-called 
exploitative decision-making strategies, where they “stick to what they know,” 
versus explorative decision-making strategies, where they consider options 
about which they have less information10—strategies definitionally required for 
creative thinking. Another line of study shows that sleep deprivation—a 
condition empirically linked to low income—leads to the privileging of habit-
directed (and therefore, again, definitionally noncreative) behaviors over goal-
directed behaviors.11 And while in some cases adversity may trigger and 
promote creative thinking, in general, the particular flavor of adversity 
accompanying poverty seems to suppress, rather than incite, the human drive to 
create.12  
This incompatibility between poverty and creative thinking appears to limit 
the potential for IP to serve as a meaningful tool of distributive justice. If those 
living in poverty tend to over-rely on decision-making strategies inconsistent 
with creativity, then, on the whole, they will be less able than their financially 
better-off counterparts to take advantage of the social and economic benefits IP 
participation has to offer. This is fundamentally inconsistent with the hope that 
IP can help remedy social and economic inequality. If anything, we should 
expect IP to exacerbate existing inequalities, because those already at a financial 
advantage are those best positioned to participate in IP and reap its benefits.  
Moreover, unlike some of the other potential incompatibilities between 
poverty and IP—for example financial barriers,13 or doctrines that favor large 
                                                                                                                     
 8 See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Your Brain on Poverty: Why Poor People Seem to Make 
Bad Decisions, ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2013/11/your-brain-on-poverty-why-poor-people-seem-to-make-bad-decisions 
/281780/ [https://perma.cc/THW5-3FD9] (discussing one study finding that “poverty, 
itself, hurts our ability to make decisions about school, finances, and life, imposing a mental 
burden similar to losing 13 IQ points”). 
 9 See infra Part II. 
 10 See Jennifer K. Lenow et al., Chronic and Acute Stress Promote Overexploitation in 
Serial Decision Making, 37 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5681, 5688 (2017). 
 11 Jie Chen et al., Sleep Deprivation Promotes Habitual Control over Goal-Directed 
Control: Behavioral and Neuroimaging Evidence, 37 J. NEUROSCIENCE 11979, 11979 
(2017). 
 12 See infra Part II. 
 13 See Lee, supra note 4, at 348–51 (discussing how the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) seeks to reduce these barriers in various ways). 
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moneyed actors over poorly financed individual creators14—the insight that 
poverty interferes with creative thinking does indeed pose an existential threat 
to IP’s viability as a tool of distributive justice. While IP doctrines can be 
changed,15 and financial barriers can be addressed by legal aid programs or 
changes in procedural requirements,16 the behavioral incompatibility between 
poverty and IP participation is different in kind. No matter how much we 
increase access to IP rights or tweak individual IP doctrines to make them fairer 
to low-income groups, the problem won’t be remedied, because it’s a problem 
of under-creation caused by poverty rather than a problem that is caused or can 
be fixed by IP itself.  
This may seem like a dire conclusion, but in fact it is quite helpful, because 
it leads to several fundamental insights about the nature of IP and our current 
attempts to use it as a tool, not only for distributive justice, but also for achieving 
optimal levels of innovation.  
First, the relationship between poverty and creativity suggests that no matter 
how noble our aspirations for IP, it is inherently ill-suited as a tool of distributive 
justice, insofar as that term is used to describe the appropriation of IP by poor 
populations to enhance their financial and social position. Rather than lament 
this fact, we can use the insight to direct our efforts at achieving distributive 
justice along more fruitful paths.  
Second, the relationship between poverty and creativity helps explain 
observed inequalities within the IP system. Though empirical data are sparse, 
the numbers that do exist suggest that children from low-income groups are 
much less likely to go on to participate in IP in their lifetimes than children from 
higher income groups.17 This is a real problem, not just from a distributive 
justice perspective, but also for the dominant view that IP is about maximizing 
socially beneficial innovation. If certain groups are innovating at lower levels, 
it raises the possibility that we are falling short—either in absolute number or in 
the types of innovations being produced—of optimality. And though a host of 
reasons for why those from low-income brackets participate less in IP are easily 
called to mind, the behavioral literature contributes a plausible and 
consequential explanation that might otherwise be overlooked in the rush to 
point to more obvious structural and cultural culprits.  
Third, the relationship between poverty and creativity prompts reflection on 
IP scholarship’s treatment of incentives. In keeping with IP’s dominant 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 41 (2009) (discussing how most patents today are issued to large 
corporations). 
 15 See id. at 109–31 (suggesting various changes to judge-made patent doctrines).  
 16 See Lee, supra note 4, at 348–51 (discussing how fee reductions and pro bono 
technical assistance to small entities and unrepresented inventors could increase access to 
the patent system).  
 17 Alex Bell et al., Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure 
to Innovation, 134 Q.J. ECON. 647, 649 (2019) (finding that high socioeconomic status at 
birth predicts later probability of obtaining a patent). 
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narrative, the scholarship is very much focused on questions relating to creative 
incentives.18 For example, do current IP doctrines provide the right balance of 
incentives?19 Are there other, better, ways beyond IP—like grants, or tax breaks, 
or even social norms20—to provide individuals with these incentives? But what 
rarely gets mentioned is the possibility that some people—perhaps even large, 
identifiable groups of people, as here—may be unable to respond to whatever 
incentives we offer them, no matter how wonderful those incentives might be. 
IP and innovation scholars might thus begin thinking much more broadly and 
holistically about what we can do to promote innovation, rather than assuming 
that getting incentives right is the end of the story.  
Along these lines, the relationship between poverty and creativity gives us 
some clues about how we might begin to do this. For example, if poverty does 
indeed interfere with creative thinking, then we might expect that interventions 
designed to combat poverty will have a beneficial effect on creativity and 
innovation. More broadly, it opens the door to considering nontraditional 
innovation-promoting policy levers—i.e., those that don’t fit the standard 
incentive formulation of financial reward as innovation carrot. Especially given 
recent work that has called into question any simple relationship between 
financial incentives and innovation output,21 these nontraditional models might 
take on a larger role in future conversations about innovation policy levers. 
Examples of such policy levers might include universal basic income programs, 
policies designed to increase access to health care, or open-ended artistic or 
scientific grants that aren’t contingent on completing any particular project. 
Fortuitously, many of these policy levers would also help realize the distributive 
justice outcomes some scholars wish to achieve through IP. Thus, rather than 
using IP as a tool of distributive justice, this Article suggests that we would be 
better off tackling distributive justice head-on—and that doing so should also 
help achieve the innovation-promoting aims traditionally relegated to IP. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I recounts the traditional incentive 
formulation of IP, along with more recent calls to justify and conceive of IP 
systems as valuable mechanisms for achieving distributive justice. To critically 
evaluate the claim that IP can indeed function as an effective tool of distributive 
                                                                                                                     
 18 See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 66–
67 (2015) (framing the question for innovation scholars as whether “patents provide a net 
innovation incentive,” or whether, alternatively, “other incentives . . . [are] superior”). 
 19 Id. at 67. 
 20 See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): 
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up 
Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1791, 1832 (2008) (raising the possibility “that social norms 
can provide incentives to create”). 
 21 See, e.g., GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE US 
RECORDING INDUSTRY 193 (2018) (concluding from an empirical study that more copyright 
“did not lead to more and better music,” as the incentives for the innovation paradigm would 
predict, because of satisficing behaviors on the part of top artists); Eric E. Johnson, 
Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 678–79 (2012) 
(arguing that psychology research undermines the traditional incentive account of IP). 
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justice by giving poor populations opportunities to accumulate wealth, Part II 
identifies and examines a potential point of incompatibility between poverty and 
IP participation based on the behavioral literature. The basic insight is that 
poverty changes decision-making. Part II extends the insight to the realm of 
creativity and concludes that conditions of poverty negatively impact creative 
decision-making and action. 
Part III explores the theoretical and practical implications of that insight. 
The first, glaring implication is that IP may not be well-suited at all as a tool of 
distributive justice, for the simple reason that those we hope will benefit from 
IP are arguably the least able to do so. Second, the insight about poverty’s 
impact on creative thinking has explanatory power, as scholars struggle to make 
sense of empirical data showing reduced IP participation among disadvantaged 
groups. Third, the relationship between poverty and creativity should prompt 
scholars to think beyond the traditional incentives-for-innovation model when 
considering how best to maximize socially beneficial creation. Creators do not 
live in a theoretical vacuum, and ostensibly extraneous circumstances in their 
lives could impact, for good or ill, their ability to respond to even the most well-
designed innovation incentives. Finally, the relationship between poverty and 
creativity suggests that policy interventions designed to ease poverty’s burden 
could also have beneficial effects on innovation. Continuing in this vein, it also 
suggests that additional policy levers with less-than-direct ties to the act of 
innovation may nevertheless be quite effective at promoting innovation—in part 
by reaching groups for whom the traditional incentives model has not proved 
effective. 
II. IP, INCENTIVES, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
The most common theoretical account of IP focuses on economic 
incentives. According to this conceptualization, IP rights exist to encourage 
people to create things that might not otherwise come into being.22 Because 
intellectual creations—like books, software, or a new technology—are easy to 
copy, it can be difficult for the creator to recoup her investment in the creative 
process.23 Once released to the public, the price a creator can charge for her 
creation quickly falls as the market gets flooded with copies by free-riders.24 If 
the creator cannot recover her investment, let alone improve her financial 
position, the thinking is that she will choose not to create at all.25  
                                                                                                                     
 22 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 129–30 (explaining the incentive theory of patents). 
 23 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 169. 
 24 David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for 
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182–83 (2009); see also 
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 453–54 (2013). 
 25 See Olson, supra note 24, at 183. 
530 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:3 
IP arguably addresses this dilemma by offering creators time-limited 
exclusive rights over their creations.26 Creators can thus charge higher prices 
for their inventions, allowing inventors to profit and offering the needed 
financial incentives to create.27 Though granting IP rights imposes costs on 
society through the deadweight losses resulting from reduced access and 
competition,28 the thought is—if IP is working as it should—that these costs 
should be outweighed by the social benefits of heightened creation and the 
economic growth that attends it.29 Because of deadweight losses, however, the 
efficiency narrative requires that we weigh the costs and benefits and grant IP 
rights only when and to the extent necessary to reap the social benefits of 
creation.30  
This economic-incentives-based rationale dominates the IP literature;31 but 
it is by no means the only purported justification for IP rights.32 The Lockean 
account, for example, asserts that creators acquire natural rights in their 
creations by virtue of the labor they have invested in the creative process.33 
Under this view, IP is simply an appropriate recognition of those rights.34 And 
the personality account argues that IP rights are necessary to protect ongoing 
personality interests that creators retain in their works.35  
                                                                                                                     
 26 Fisher, supra note 1, at 169. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantifying the Cost of Substandard Patents: Some 
Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 240, 241 (2010); Olson, supra note 24, at 195. 
 29 See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-
to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 690 & n.73 (2014) (arguing that innovation enhances 
social welfare by promoting economic growth). 
 30 See Olson, supra note 24, at 195. 
 31 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 168–72. 
 32 A number of additional utilitarian variations on the traditional incentives-to-create 
account have also been proposed, including accounts wherein IP incentives are required to 
encourage creators to disclose or commercialize their inventions. See, e.g., Michael 
Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 
1073–76 (2007) (discussing commercialization theory, according to which patents provide 
incentives for inventors to commercialize their inventions); Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark 
A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1432 (2009) (same); Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (same); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 745 (2012) (same); Roberto Mazzoleni & 
Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. 
ISSUES 1031, 1038 (1998) (discussing the utilitarian disclosure theory, according to which 
patents provide incentives for inventors to disclose their inventions rather than keep them 
secret). 
 33 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285–86 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 34 E.g., MERGES, supra note 2, at 32–33; Fisher, supra note 1, at 170; Stephanie 
Plamondon Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297, 309 (2015); 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1753 
(2012); Rosenblatt, supra note 24, at 445.  
 35 E.g., MERGES, supra note 2, at 68–100; Fromer, supra note 34, at 1753; Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 329–30 (1988); Margaret 
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But perhaps the most interesting alternative36 account of IP comes from 
those who have conceptualized IP as a valuable tool for promoting human 
flourishing and distributive justice.37 Distributive justice theorists owe a debt to 
Rawls’s philosophical writings on fairness and social justice,38 which they often 
employ to address questions of intellectual production and distribution.39  
A notable work in this vein is Madhavi Sunder’s 2006 article IP3. In it, 
Sunder laments the dearth of “‘giant-sized’ intellectual property theories 
capable of accommodating the full range of human values implicit in intellectual 
production.”40 She argues for a cultural account of IP that recognizes “not just 
efficiency, but a number of incommensurable values: from the right to health, 
to the freedom to create, to democracy, equality, and distributive justice.”41  
Since IP3 was published, a number of scholars have responded to the call to 
consider IP through the lens of distributive justice.42 And while much of this 
                                                                                                                     
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–78 (1982); Rosenblatt, 
supra note 24, at 457. 
 36 In calling distributive justice an “alternative” account I don’t mean to suggest that its 
proponents eschew economic efficiency as a proper frame through which to conduct IP 
analyses. In fact, most of the scholars cited here explicitly acknowledge the importance of 
considering efficiency at some level. Where most depart from traditional accounts is in their 
desire to also consider a range of other values and interests—including distributive justice—
while conducting these analyses.  
 37 E.g., Fisher, supra note 1, at 190–93 (listing distributive justice as one of the concerns 
of what he calls the “social planning theory” of IP).  
 38 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 39 E.g., MERGES, supra note 2, at 101–04 (discussing distributive justice theories of IP 
in light of Rawls’s theories of distributive justice); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, 
Foreword: Is Nozick Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS. L. REV. 563, 568–72 (2007) (discussing various articles in a symposium issue that 
draw from Rawls in crafting arguments about IP and distributive justice). 
 40 Sunder, supra note 3, at 260. 
 41 Id. at 313; see also Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development 
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2823 (2006) (“[I]ntellectual property should include a 
substantive equality principle, measuring its welfare-generating outcomes not only by 
economic growth but also by distributional effects.”); Fisher, supra note 1, at 172 (describing 
a theoretical approach to IP—what Fisher terms the “social planning” approach—wherein 
scholars take the view “that property rights in general—and intellectual-property rights in 
particular—can and should be shaped so as to help foster the achievement of a just and 
attractive culture”); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1540 (2005) (highlighting the “distributive aspects” of copyright).  
 42 See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law 
(with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717 
(2007) (highlighting themes in the IP and distributive justice literature); Oren Bracha & 
Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 229, 287–99 (2014) (developing a distributive analytical framework for 
copyright); Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of 
Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 857 (2007) (addressing how 
“notions of distributive justice [should] inform management of the commons through the 
construction of intellectual property law”); Lee, supra note 4, at 325 (arguing that U.S. patent 
law “already possesses numerous ‘distributive mechanisms,’” and “sketch[ing] the contours 
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literature argues for limiting or otherwise altering intellectual property regimes 
in various ways to improve public access to intellectual products produced by 
the well-funded,43 many distributive justice theorists also evince a desire to see 
“historically disempowered individuals”44 who are artists, inventors, and 
creators wielding IP themselves—as a “tool for recognition and redistribution, 
development, and human rights.”45 In other words, because IP participation 
confers financial and social benefits, the thought is that socioeconomically 
disadvantaged populations can (and should) make use of IP to improve their 
lives.46  
In fact, some scholars argue that existing IP regimes already achieve these 
ends to some extent.47 In their article Copyright and Distributive Justice, for 
example, Justin Hughes and Robert Merges contend that “copyright in its 
current form is a powerful tool to empower creative individuals”48—especially 
socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals—economically and socially. To 
support their argument, they point to a 2009 Forbes listing of the wealthiest 
African Americans in the United States, all of them “self-made.” Based on this 
list, they conclude that it is copyright—specifically, the “copyright industries” 
of “music, film, television, broadcast professional sports, and publishing” that 
can be thanked “for the accumulation of the most substantial African-American 
fortunes.”49 
                                                                                                                     
of a distributive agenda for domestic patent law” going forward); Rosenblatt, supra note 24, 
at 458–59 (describing the “distributive justice” theoretical approach to IP analysis).  
 43 William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Health Care: Developing Drugs 
for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583 (2007) (proposing a prize regime 
to improve access to pharmaceuticals in developing countries); Peter Lee, Toward a 
Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 925 (highlighting “various 
‘accommodation strategies’ for integrating distributive values in an innovation system 
fundamentally predicated on profit maximization”); Lea Shaver, Copyright and Inequality, 
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 117, 124 (2014) (discussing how IP limits access among poorer 
populations to copyrighted works).  
 44 Sunder, supra note 3, at 263. 
 45 Id. at 264.  
 46 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 364 (“[O]btaining patents on their own inventions can 
empower marginalized and low-income communities, thus achieving more equitable 
distribution of the fruits of intellectual property protection.”). The interest of some scholars 
in so-called “traditional knowledge” protection is a related strain of this literature. One 
possible justification for protecting traditional knowledge is that IP rights in such knowledge 
can protect indigenous populations and local communities from exploitation and help 
empower them with property rights of their own. See Justin Hughes, Traditional Knowledge, 
Cultural Expression, and the Siren’s Call of Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1215, 1256–
61 (2012) (describing a distributive justification for traditional knowledge protection). 
 47 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4, at 347–52 (describing various mechanisms by which the 
U.S. patent system attempts to facilitate IP participation, including fee reductions and 
technical assistance for small entities and unrepresented inventors); Shaffer Van Houweling, 
supra note 41, at 1540–41 (discussing how copyright helps subsidize creators who would 
otherwise not be able to afford the investments necessary to engage in creative labor). 
 48 Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 516. 
 49 Id. at 554. 
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Of course Hughes, Merges, and others writing in this area acknowledge that 
IP as presently constituted is not the perfect vehicle for empowering the poor, 
remedying inequality, and achieving distributive justice.50 Nor do they argue 
that IP should be the only, or even the primary, tool for achieving these ends.51 
But the desire to see IP as one such tool—and to improve its ability to act in this 
capacity through various doctrinal and procedural adjustments52—remains.  
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POVERTY AND CREATIVITY 
The idea that IP can and should serve as a mechanism for promoting 
distributive justice by giving the poor opportunities to reap the social and 
economic benefits it confers is both intriguing and attractive. Creation and 
inventorship enjoy a certain mystique in our culture,53 as does the conception of 
the United States as a meritocracy.54 The story of IP as a tool of distributive 
justice taps into both of these romantic notions. It is tantalizing to envision 
otherwise disadvantaged populations rising up on the wings of their creative 
talent, boosted by IP regimes that give them the mechanism for translating this 
talent into money and status. The stirring language employed by distributive 
justice IP scholars adds rhetorical depth to this vision. Most people sympathetic 
to social justice generally, for example, would be moved by the thought of the 
previously-disempowered “assert[ing] themselves as intellectual property 
subjects, controlling rights in cultural creations, and reject[ing] earlier 
categorization as law’s objects.”55  
But is this distributive agenda for IP realistic? In its defense, the list cited 
by Hughes and Merges does suggest that at least some subset of the 
socioeconomically disadvantaged population—specifically, several African 
Americans from humble financial backgrounds—has benefitted financially and 
                                                                                                                     
 50 See id. at 552 (“Copyright would be a better tool with some of the policy alternatives 
we describe later in this Article.”); Lee, supra note 4, at 367 (arguing that “Congress, courts, 
and agencies—particularly the USPTO—should promote a more robust vision of the patent 
system’s distributive capabilities”). 
 51 Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 552 (“[C]opyright is a meager tool for distributive 
justice compared to basic social reforms that are possible—principally a significant (multi-
decade) strengthening and equalization of K-12 public education. Indeed, we believe that 
copyright would be a better distributive tool if coupled with a substantially strengthened 
educational system for minorities.”). 
 52 See id. at 573–75 (discussing ways in which the copyright system could better fulfill 
a distributive agenda); Lee, supra note 4, at 367–74 (discussing ways in which the patent 
system could better fulfill a distributive agenda). 
 53 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 32, at 710 (“Any elementary school student can recite 
a number of canonical American invention stories.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Matthew Stewart, The 9.9 Percent Is the New American Aristocracy, 
ATLANTIC (June 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/06/the-birth-
of-a-new-american-aristocracy/559130/ [https://perma.cc/VAW4-X4J7] (describing one of 
the “founding myths” of the U.S. meritocracy: “[T]he meritorious get ahead, [and] the 
rewards [they] receive are in direct proportion to [their] merit.”).  
 55 Sunder, supra note 3, at 275. 
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socially from their careers in IP-heavy industries.56 Take Oprah Winfrey 
(number 1 on the Forbes list cited by Hughes and Merges),57 for example. Born 
in rural Mississippi where she spent the first six years of her life with her 
grandmother,58 the remainder of Oprah’s childhood was spent being shuttled 
between her mother’s home in a Milwaukee ghetto and her father’s home in 
Nashville, Tennessee.59 By any account, it was a difficult and impoverished 
upbringing.60 But that all changed when she was offered a job as a news anchor 
with CBS’s Nashville affiliate61—her entrance into the “copyright industries.” 
From there, she steadily gained increasing exposure and opportunity, appearing 
on her own talk show and in a breakthrough role in Steven Spielberg’s 1982 
film The Color Purple,62 and eventually maturing into the multimedia and 
publishing giant the public knows her as today.63  
Additional anecdotes can also be brought to mind, and they are not limited 
to the Forbes list of wealthy African Americans. J.K. Rowling was raised in 
middle class circumstances but was living in poverty as a single mother and 
collecting welfare benefits when she completed her first Harry Potter novel.64 
                                                                                                                     
 56 Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 552–53. 
 57 Id. at 552. 
 58 Paul Harris, You Go, Girl, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2005), https://www.theguardian 
.com/media/2005/nov/20/television.usa [https://perma.cc/5YKV-ZGKV]; Jill Nelson, 
The Man Who Saved Oprah Winfrey, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 1986), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/magazine/1986/12/14/the-man-who-saved-oprah-win 
frey/66d7b7b3-98af-4495-82a7-6b04827f1bd6/ [https://perma.cc/LU7B-LRE7]. 
 59 GEORGE MAIR, OPRAH WINFREY: THE REAL STORY 13–14 (1994); Nelson, supra 
note 58. 
 60 See, e.g., Thomas Morgan, Troubled Girl’s Evolution into an Oscar Nominee, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 4, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/04/movies/troubled-girl-s-evol 
ution-into-an-oscar-nominee.html [https://perma.cc/KYE4-WXX6] (describing Oprah’s 
history of being abused and her mother’s threat to “put Miss Winfrey into a juvenile 
detention home”); Nelson, supra note 58 (describing how Oprah had been sexually abused 
by “male relatives and family friends,” how she ran away from her Milwaukee home as a 
child, and the moment she “realized [she] was poor”). 
 61 Nelson, supra note 58. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., The Most Influential US Liberals: 1–20, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 31, 2007), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1435442/The-most-influential-US-liberals-
1-20.html [https://perma.cc/2NLH-EJH7] (ranking Oprah as the 9th most influential liberal 
in the U.S. and “[v]ery possibly the most influential woman in the world,” who “has become 
a huge franchise, including not just her eponymous television show but a radio show, 
magazine and book club”); Brad Oswald, Yes, She’s Queen of All Media, but to Discovery, 
She’s Life Itself, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS (Jan. 26, 2010), https://www.winnipegfreepress 
.com/arts-and-life/entertainment/TV/yes-shes-queen-of-all-media-but-to-discovery-shes 
-life-itself-82678662.html [https://perma.cc/SW84-K6XZ] (“Bad TV. Good TV. Great 
TV. Oprah.”). 
 64 JK Rowling, The Fringe Benefits of Failure, TED (June 2008), https://www.ted 
.com/talks/jk_rowling_the_fringe_benefits_of_failure?language=srp  [https://perma.cc 
/4VA9-J2GM] (stating that at the time she wrote the first Harry Potter novel she was as 
“poor as it is possible to be in modern Britain, without being homeless”). But see Ian Parker, 
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And WhatsApp founder and Ukraine native Jan Koum lived as a teenager on 
government assistance in California with his mother before developing an 
interest in computer programming.65 The mobile messaging company he 
founded is the owner of multiple patents66 and was eventually sold to Facebook 
for $19 billion dollars.67  
But as Hughes and Merges acknowledge, anecdotes are not data.68 So how 
can we determine whether we should expect these anecdotes to generalize? In 
other words, what is clear from these examples is that certain members of 
disadvantaged populations have pulled themselves out of poverty by generating 
IP-protected artistic and technical content. But what remains to be determined 
is whether a similar trajectory is available to a meaningful segment of the tens 
of millions of poor in the United States who remain.69 If we are going to treat 
IP as a serious mechanism for achieving distributive justice—at least in the 
sense we’re talking about here—then this should be the goal.  
One way to approach the problem is to ask how compatible poverty is with 
IP participation. Take a hypothetical poor citizen possessed of both the 
                                                                                                                     
Mugglemarch, NEW YORKER (Sept. 24, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2012/10/01/mugglemarch [https://perma.cc/B39M-MTB2] (acknowledging that at the 
time she wrote her first novel Rowling was a “broke single mother, in poor accommodations, 
at a time of high unemployment,” but also noting her relative advantages: “[S]he was a 
middle-class graduate, poised to start a teaching career, who claimed modest state benefits 
while she finished a novel, which she partly wrote in an upscale café owned by her sister’s 
husband.”). 
 65 Parmy Olson, Exclusive: The Rags-to-Riches Tale of How Jan Koum Built WhatsApp 
into Facebook’s New $19 Billion Baby, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/parmyolson/2014/02/19/exclusive-inside-story-how-jan-koum-built-whatsapp-in 
to-facebooks-new-19-billion-baby/#4418fff22fa1[https://perma.cc/8ZSJ-Z4DT]. 
 66 Patents Assigned to WhatsApp Inc., JUSTIA PATENTS, https://patents.justia.com/ 
assignee/whatsapp-inc [https://perma.cc/DK35-XHXT]. 
 67 Olson, supra note 65. 
 68 See Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 555 (“We should also repeat that we are not 
proposing that copyright has wealth redistributive impact for African Americans as a whole, 
as would be needed in an argument about wealth distribution to meet Rawls’s Difference 
Principle. Our argument is that on the Rawlsian question of ‘conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity,’ copyright is doing much good whereas many other social structures are not.”). 
 69 What Is the Current Poverty Rate in the United States?, U.C. DAVIS CTR. FOR 
POVERTY RES. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-current-poverty-rate-
united-states [https://perma.cc/PM3V-VLYA] (stating that the official poverty rate in the 
United States as of 2017 was 12.3%, or approximately 39.7 million people); see also Steven 
Pressman, New Data Paint an Unpleasant Picture of Poverty in the US, CONVERSATION 
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://theconversation.com/new-data-paint-an-unpleasant-picture-of 
-poverty-in-the-us-101069 [https://perma.cc/89JW-PE4K] (arguing that “things look even 
worse” than the official poverty rate “if we use what many scholars like myself believe is a 
better poverty measure”). According to Pressman, the poverty rate is probably “two to four 
percentage points above the official U.S. measure,” which translates into up to 12.9 million 
additional people living in poverty. Id. 
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necessary talent and desire to generate IP-protectable content.70 Can we expect 
that this citizen will actually be able to generate the content and avail herself of 
the advantages IP confers? Or are there conditions specific to the circumstance 
of poverty that are incompatible with this goal? If the latter, then the case for IP 
as a generalizable mechanism for distributive justice is weakened.  
The quick answer is, of course, that there are many incompatibilities 
between IP participation and poverty, some of which easily spring to mind. 
Inadequate education,71 reduced opportunities for professional employment that 
provides an outlet for creative talent,72 and a scarcity of time73 and money might 
all help explain why a poor person who otherwise has the aptitude and desire 
might not end up creating something that is both IP-protectable and likely to 
generate meaningful income. And even if she does manage to innovate in this 
way, barriers such as unfamiliarity with the IP system,74 inability to pay the 
                                                                                                                     
 70 When I speak of IP-protectable content in this way, I’m referring to the subset of IP-
protectable content that also has the potential to generate income and social status for the 
creator. Because copyright in particular has a very low bar for what is considered protectable 
and no formal requirements for acquiring protection, copyrighted content that does not have 
such potential is generated by most everyone on a regular basis, but does not help advance 
the goal of distributive justice I’m concerned with here.  
 71 See, e.g., Maria Danilova, Poverty, Segregation Persist in U.S. Schools, Report Says, 
PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/education/poverty-
segregation-persist-in-u-s-schools-report-says [https://perma.cc/ZCV6-WUBX] (covering 
a report conducted by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights finding that “[t]oo often, low-
income, black and Latino students end up in schools with crumbling walls, old textbooks and 
unqualified teachers”).  
 72 See Marlene Kim, Problems Facing the Working Poor, in BALANCING ACTS: EASING 
THE BURDENS AND IMPROVING THE OPTIONS FOR WORKING FAMILIES 49, 53 (Eileen 
Applebaum ed., 2000) (reporting that the working poor are overrepresented in jobs that 
involve repetitive tasks like “agricultural work[] and machine operat[ion]”). 
 73 MARK A. RUNCO & STEVEN R. PRITZKER, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA CREATIVITY 333 (1999) 
(“For many creative people, time is the most precious of all resources, without which creative 
work is simply impossible.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 17, at 647–48 (finding that exposure during childhood 
to other inventors makes it more likely that a child will himself go on to become an inventor); 
K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 353–54 (1999) (explaining how the 1909 Copyright Act’s 
complex registration requirements may have prevented black artists historically from getting 
protection for their work); Sunder, supra note 3, at 273 (“Problems encountered in protecting 
the knowledge of the poor [may] turn . . . on the poor’s lack of knowledge of their 
rights . . . .”).  
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required fees,75 or even bias on the part of IP’s gatekeepers76 may prevent her 
from acquiring or enforcing IP rights in her creation. 
These incompatibilities almost certainly exist, as scholars advancing a 
distributive agenda for IP have acknowledged to varying extents.77 But the hope 
is that they can be addressed—in some cases relatively easily.78 Peter Lee, for 
example, argues that reducing financial barriers to entry could be a productive 
way to broaden access to the U.S. patent system, and points to steps the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has already taken in this direction 
as a hopeful sign.79  
But there is another incompatibility between poverty and IP participation, 
perhaps even more pernicious than the others because to this point it has largely 
flown under the radar. This incompatibility arises at the behavioral level. A 
growing body of work is revealing how poverty influences decision-making—
the way people go about their lives and the decisions they make every day. And 
much of what researchers have found is relevant to creativity. In fact, what their 
findings suggest is that it might be very difficult, in the psychological sense, for 
a person living in poverty to engage in the creative process. 
                                                                                                                     
 75 See Gene Quinn, US Patent Office Fees, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 11, 2015), https:// 
www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/11/us-patent-office-fees/id=56707/ [https://perma.cc/ 
F4YQ-RVZE] (estimating that it would cost a small entity a minimum $1210 in application 
and issuance fees to successfully apply for and issue a nonprovisional utility patent); Kiah 
Treece, How Much Does a Patent Cost? Types, Factors & Ways to Save, FIT SMALL BUS. 
(June 26, 2018), https://fitsmallbusiness.com/how-much-does-a-patent-cost/ [https:// 
perma.cc/M8BM-MHSY] (estimating that the cost of successfully prosecuting a patent 
with an attorney’s help ranges from a minimum of $5000 to about $15,000 for a more 
complex patent). Even the $55 copyright registration fee may seem prohibitive to someone 
who is living in poverty. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 4: COPYRIGHT OFFICE FEES 2 
(2018). 
 76 See, e.g., Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 
355, 375–82 (2016) (arguing that courts tend to apply copyright’s fair use doctrine in ways 
that favor rich and successful artists at the expense of less-well-known creators); K.J. Greene, 
Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 365, 371–72 (2008) (arguing that doctrines like the 
idea/expression dichotomy, the fixation standard, and the originality standard all favor white 
artists at the expense of black artists and in fact may encourage white artists to appropriate 
and gain protection over black artists’ work); Greene, supra note 74, at 375–83 (1999) 
(same). 
 77 See, e.g., Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 556–61 (discussing the various barriers 
disadvantaged populations face in their struggle to participate in IP); Sunder, supra note 3, 
at 273 (“Problems encountered in protecting the knowledge of the poor [may] turn . . . on 
the poor’s lack of knowledge of their rights.”). 
 78 See Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 561 (proposing “ways in which the copyright 
system could further strengthen wealth distribution to authors”). 
 79 Lee, supra note 4, at 347–52, 363–67. 
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A. Poverty and Decision-Making Generally 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the circumstance of poverty influences 
decision-making. Some of the most comprehensive behavioral work on the 
subject comes from cognitive scientist Eldar Shafir. Shafir has found that the 
conditions common to poverty, including “tight financial challenges, instability 
of income and expenses, low savings, no insurance, and several other stressors,” 
lead to deep changes in decision-making processes, affecting “attention, 
cognitive resources, and ensuing decisions.”80 
Often, the practical result of these changes is a co-opting of scarce 
attentional resources to deal with pressing, day-to-day needs.81 Consequently, 
fewer resources are available for other mental tasks.82 Shafir’s work focuses on 
how this makes it particularly difficult for those living in poverty to make the 
decisions necessary to get ahead—for example, when all one’s attention is 
focused on today’s urgent need to pay rent, the high interest rates on the payday 
loan required to meet that need may be overlooked.83 But it is clear that the 
cognitive load poverty imposes affects more than just financial decision-
making. In one study, for instance, Shafir and colleagues found that inducing 
thoughts about finances reduced cognitive performance in a range of tasks—
like spatial processing and creative problem solving84—in poor participants,85 
while having no such effect on the more well-off.86  
The neuroscience research on poverty and the brain supports Shafir’s 
findings, and is perhaps even more concerning. Shafir emphasizes that what his 
research shows is that it is the circumstance of poverty itself—rather than some 
other explanation like genetic differences or stress—that causes cognitive 
impairments.87 Thus, he sanguinely points to studies showing that moving to a 
better neighborhood can positively impact things like college attendance and 
earnings.88 But what a large neuroscience literature suggests is that when 
                                                                                                                     
 80 Eldar Shafir, Decisions in Poverty Contexts, 18 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 131, 
131 (2017). 
 81 Id. at 132. 
 82 Id. at 132–33. 
 83 Id. at 133. 
 84 Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCIENCE 976, 977 
(2013) (describing the tests they used to measure cognitive functioning, including a spatial 
task designed to measure “cognitive control” and “the ability to guide thought and action in 
accordance with internal goals,” and Raven’s Progressive Matrices test, designed to measure 
“‘fluid intelligence,’ the capacity to think logically and solve problems in novel situations, 
independent of acquired knowledge”). 
 85 Id. (describing how they categorized subjects as either “rich” or “poor,” with those 
they categorized as poor “roughly corresponding to those in the lower quartile or third of the 
U.S. income distribution”).  
 86 Id. at 977–78. 
 87 Id. at 976 (“This suggests a causal, not merely correlational, relationship between 
poverty and mental function.”). 
 88 Shafir, supra note 80, at 134. 
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poverty is experienced during childhood in particular, it can lead to lifelong 
deficits in cognitive functioning.89  
These effects are thought to be linked to disrupted brain development 
trajectories. Brain development is a process that takes place throughout 
childhood and young adulthood, and is largely complete by the time a person 
reaches her mid-twenties.90 Because a young person’s brain is the most 
malleable at this time,91 the conditions of poverty can disrupt developmental 
trajectories,92 presumably leading to cognitive impairments—including deficits 
in language ability, memory, and goal-directed behaviors.93 And because the 
window of malleability eventually closes, these brain impairments, if present in 
early adulthood, can last a lifetime.94 Even if a person eventually escapes a 
poverty situation, the changes to brain structure and function may persist. So 
while some effects of poverty on decision-making, such as those detailed by 
Shafir and his team, may be the direct result of current exposure to poverty 
conditions, and thus may resolve when the conditions are ameliorated, others 
may flow from earlier, childhood exposure to poverty, and thus may be resistant 
to environmental improvements.  
B. Poverty and Creativity 
The findings on poverty, decision-making, and brain development are 
concerning, and, as commentators have pointed out, have a range of 
implications for various areas of social and political concern, including public 
                                                                                                                     
 89 See, e.g., Martha J. Farah, Socioeconomic Status and the Brain: Prospects for 
Neuroscience-Informed Policy, 19 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 428, 429–31 (2018) 
(reviewing the literature). 
 90 See, e.g., Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise 
and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 216, 216 (2009) (explaining that certain parts of the brain “may not be fully 
developed until halfway through the third decade of life”). 
 91 Nandini Mundkur, Neuroplasticity in Children, 72 INDIAN J. PEDIATRICS 855, 856 
(2005) (noting that “plasticity of the brain is . . . maximal during the critical periods [that 
occur in youth]”); see, e.g., Ronald L. Simons & Eric T. Klopack, Invited Address: “The 
Times They Are A-Changin’”: Gene Expression, Neuroplasticity, and Developmental 
Research, 44 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 573, 575–76 (2015) (discussing the empirical 
evidence supporting neuroplasticity in children). 
 92 See, e.g., Kimberly G. Noble et al., Socioeconomic Disparities in Neurocognitive 
Development in the First Two Years of Life, 57 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 535, 535 
(2015). 
 93 E.g., Martha J. Farah et al., Childhood Poverty: Specific Associations with 
Neurocognitive Development, 1110 BRAIN RES. 166, 168 (2006). 
 94 E.g., Shafir, supra note 80, at 134.  
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health,95 criminal law,96 education,97 and more. But to this point, no one has 
explored how these findings might read on the potential for the poor to engage 
in creative and innovative pursuits. 
It is clear, however, that they are relevant to this question. For example, 
Shafir and colleagues’ finding that financial concerns in the poor reduce 
cognitive functioning in areas like creative problem solving98 is directly relevant 
to the question of how well and how often we might expect those living in 
poverty to innovate. And the fact that poverty experienced in childhood can lead 
to lifelong difficulties with language and goal-directed behaviors is also 
concerning, as many creative pursuits require facility with these very tasks.99 
One 2008 study, for example, found that brain activity in the prefrontal cortex, 
an area integral to creativity and problem solving, was significantly different 
between seven and twelve year olds from low socioeconomic households and 
those from higher-status households.100 The differences were so extreme that 
researchers remarked that the poor children’s brain activity resembled that of 
adults who had suffered brain damage.101 
More recent empirical work in psychology and neuroscience also supports 
the hypothesis that those living in poverty may find it particularly difficult, 
psychologically speaking, to engage in creative pursuits. Specifically, the poor 
may be pressed by their circumstances to employ so-called exploitative and 
habit-based decision-making strategies that make creativity harder to come by.  
                                                                                                                     
 95 See, e.g., Amanda Sheffield Morris et al., Targeting Parenting in Early Childhood: 
A Public Health Approach to Improve Outcomes for Children Living in Poverty, 88 CHILD 
DEV. 388, 388 (2017). 
 96 E.g., Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Malleable Rationality, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 17, 38–39 
(2018). 
 97 Farah, supra note 89, at 434 (explaining how SES disparities and their effect on the 
brain “have implications for education policy”). 
 98 Mani et al., supra note 84, at 977. 
 99 See, e.g., Christina E. Shalley, Effects of Coaction, Expected Evaluation, and Goal 
Setting on Creativity and Productivity, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 483, 483 (1995) (finding that 
subjects were most creative when they were able to set their own creativity goals).  
 100 Mark M. Kishiyama et al., Socioeconomic Disparities Affect Prefrontal Function in 
Children, 21 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1106, 1106 (2008); see also Robert Sanders, 
EEGs Show Brain Differences Between Poor and Rich Kids, U.C. BERKELEY NEWS (Dec. 2, 
2008), https://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2008/12/02_cortex.shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/ZS96-58XY] (reporting on the study) (“In a study recently accepted for 
publication by the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, scientists at UC Berkeley’s Helen 
Wills Neuroscience Institute and the School of Public Health report that normal 9- and 10-
year-olds differing only in socioeconomic status have detectable differences in the response 
of their prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain that is critical for problem solving and 
creativity.”). 
 101 See Kishiyama et al., supra note 100, at 1106 (“We found that prefrontal-dependent 
electrophysiological measures of attention were reduced in LSES compared to high SES 
(HSES) children in a pattern similar to that observed in patients with lateral prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) damage.”). 
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1. Exploitative Versus Explorative Decision-Making 
A subject of study in the decision-making literature is how and when people 
employ exploitative decision-making strategies versus explorative decision-
making strategies, two ways of thinking that use distinct brain architectures.102 
The first type can be thought of as a “stick-with-what-you-know” approach, 
while the second involves exploring new options.103 While each has its 
place104—for example, it would make little sense to keep exploring new ways 
to get from your home to work when you have already found the most efficient 
route—external circumstances in peoples’ lives might sometimes cause the 
appropriate balance of strategies to get out of whack, leading to suboptimal 
decision-making.105  
A recent study shows that stress, as measured by the level of the stress 
hormone cortisol, is one of these external circumstances.106 Specifically, when 
subjects were exposed to a stressor that increased their cortisol, they tended to 
over-rely on exploitative decision-making, weighing costs and benefits 
incorrectly and sticking to known strategies even when exploring new options 
would have led to better outcomes.107 The authors hypothesize that stress 
contributes to a perception that one’s environment is “harsh and unfair;” the 
decision-maker might thus conclude that it makes little difference what 
approach he employs, as the outcome will likely be negative no matter what.108 
Better, then, to conserve resources by using the less taxing exploitation strategy 
than to take a risk on exploration the decision-maker has little hope will pay 
off.109  
Cortisol, the hormone that mediates this inefficient decision-making 
strategy, has close ties to poverty. Poverty is stressful, and the bodies of those 
who experience it produce cortisol in response to this stress.110 A number of 
studies have documented how high cortisol levels go hand in hand with poverty 
and how this affects brain development and decision-making in the moment and 
                                                                                                                     
 102 Daniella Laureiro-Martínez et al., Understanding the Exploration–Exploitation 
Dilemma: An fMRI Study of Attention Control and Decision-Making Performance, 36 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 319, 320 (2015). 
 103 Madeline B. Harms, Stress and Exploitative Decision-Making, 37 J. NEUROSCIENCE 
10035, 10035 (2017).  
 104 See Laureiro-Martínez et al., supra note 102, at 319. 
 105 See Harms, supra note 103, at 10035. 
 106 Lenow et al., supra note 10, at 5681. 
 107 Id. at 5685–86.  
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over time.111 Though cortisol serves a legitimate physiological function—it 
contributes, for example, to the “fight or flight” response,112 and insufficient 
levels of cortisol can also lead to decision-making impairments113—in general, 
sustained high levels of cortisol, such as those seen in impoverished populations, 
tend to have negative effects on health and decision-making.114 Perceiving your 
environment as “harsh and unfair”—a contributor to stress and heightened 
cortisol115—also has ties to individuals’ experience as members of traditionally 
disadvantaged race and gender groups. Exposure to race-related stress, for 
example, leads to sustained heightened stress response in black subjects.116 
These findings can tell us something about poverty and creativity. When 
considering what kind of decision-making—explorative or exploitative—is 
involved in creativity, we would expect the former to play a particularly 
important role.117 Creativity, by definition, means making something new.118 It 
would be impossible to make something new without engaging in explorative 
decision-making—the kind of decision-making that involves seeking out new 
information and options.119 If the economically disadvantaged, due to the 
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stressful nature of their environments, over-rely on exploitative decision-
making strategies at the expense of exploration,120 it will be more difficult for 
them to engage in truly creative behaviors.  
2. Habit- Versus Goal-Based Behaviors 
Just as people can choose whether to employ exploitative or explorative 
decision-making strategies in their daily lives, they can also choose at any 
moment whether they are going to engage in reflexive, habit-based, decision-
making or more reflective, goal-directed decision-making.121 Each strategy is 
directed by different neural circuits and comes with a unique suite of costs and 
benefits.122 In goal-directed (also known as reflective or model-based) decision-
making, a person consciously desires a specific outcome and analyzes various 
ways to get there, ultimately choosing the path he thinks is most likely to lead 
to the result he wants.123 In contrast, during habit-based (also known as reflexive 
or model-free) decision-making, a person relies heavily on past experience to 
make quick utility calculations and does not invest as much conscious thought 
in the nuances of present circumstances and how they might affect outcomes.124 
While goal-directed decision-making has the advantage of being flexible and 
adaptable to the specific situation at hand, it is also cognitively costly.125 Habit-
directed decision-making, on the other hand, is an efficient heuristic, but may 
lead to more errors because it is less flexible, and more of a “one-size fits all” 
approach.126 Like exploration and exploitation, habit-based and goal-based 
decision-making each have their place in human action, but they must be 
appropriately selected and balanced for optimal decision-making.  
The choice between a habit- or goal-based strategy in any given instance 
also has implications for creativity. Because creativity is about making 
something new,127 it and a habit-based approach—which by definition involves 
doing what you’ve done before—are at odds.128 Instead, a goal-directed 
approach, which involves mental flexibility, deep cognitive engagement, and a 
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close conscious attention to one’s environment129 is more consistent with 
creative action.130 
Enter now the evidence that individuals suffering the stresses of poverty 
may over-rely on habit-based decision-making approaches. A recent study 
shows that sleep deprivation privileges habit-based decision-making strategies 
over goal-based decision-making strategies.131 Those subject to sleep 
deprivation over-rely on habit, using it to make decisions even when a goal-
based approach would be more appropriate.132 Sleep deprivation, in turn, has 
well-known empirical ties to both poverty and race. Those with financial 
struggles, as well as African Americans and Latinos, are much more likely to 
experience poor sleep quality than whites and those with higher socioeconomic 
status.133 Stress is thought to play an important role in this interaction, in 
addition to specific life circumstances like employment, education, and health 
status.134  
These findings also have something to say about poverty and creativity. 
What they tell us is that the poor are the most likely to suffer sleep 
deprivation,135 which in turn makes them more susceptible to an over-reliance 
on habit-based action136—a decision-making strategy unlikely to lead to 
creative thought.137 
3. Conclusions 
When one considers together the various strains of research studying the 
psychology and neuroscience of poverty, one inference seems increasingly 
inescapable: poverty harms the brain, and interferes with decision-making 
processes, in ways that hinder one’s ability to think and act creatively.  
This conclusion might seem strange at first. After all, aren’t many artists 
and innovators poor? We can all easily call to mind examples. And what about 
the proverbial “starving artist”? Isn’t he a proverb for a reason? 
In the absence of empirical research that directly tackles the link between 
poverty and creativity, it is impossible to answer these questions conclusively. 
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But until then, a couple of possibilities might help explain the disconnect 
between the conclusions I draw here and popular intuitions. 
First, when one visualizes the proverbial starving artist, one often pictures 
someone who has chosen poverty as the price for pursuing and perfecting their 
craft.138 Psychologically speaking, this could be a very different situation from 
the one encountered by someone who was raised in poverty, or who otherwise 
cannot choose to not be poor. While to the former group, poverty might be 
psychologically empowering, a statement of life choices and values,139 to the 
latter, poverty may do little more than make it harder to think creatively in the 
ways already discussed. And in any case, as some commentators have pointed 
out, the myth of the starving artist may be just that—a myth.140 
But if this latter point is true, then why can we so easily bring to mind 
examples of artists and innovators who emerged with their creations from 
humble backgrounds? This could be due in part to our collective biases. The 
story of the poor innovator or artist is a compelling one; for that reason it might 
be repeated often and, through the workings of the availability heuristic,141 be 
more easily called to mind than the many, many stories of artists and inventors 
who come from more privileged backgrounds.142 For example, while the tale of 
Oprah’s humble upbringing might be widely known and reported on, fewer 
people may be aware that Taylor Swift is the child of a financial advisor and 
marketing executive,143 or that Bill Gates’s father was a prominent lawyer, 
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while his mother served on the board of directors of a financial holding 
company.144 Because of these biases, we may become overly sanguine about 
the ability of those living in poverty to engage in creative and innovative 
pursuits.  
IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. IP and Distributive Justice 
For over a decade, IP scholars have been calling for distributive justice to 
take its rightful place among the justifications for and goals of IP regimes.145 
But converting IP into an effective tool of distributive justice—in the sense of 
facilitating IP acquisition and assertion by members of disadvantaged groups—
may be far more difficult to attain on a large scale than previously imagined. 
There are the previously-recognized incompatibilities between poverty and IP 
acquisition and assertion, of course: incompatibilities like the financial and 
social barriers inherent in navigating the IP system146 that scholars tend to be 
optimistic about policymakers’ ability to address.147 But a more existential 
challenge to the aspirations of IP and distributive justice proponents is 
highlighted by the behavioral incompatibility described here: the finding that 
poverty severely limits the ability of those experiencing it to think and act in 
creative ways.148  
Poverty’s destructive influence on creative thought and action will make it 
very difficult for those living in poverty’s throes to arrive at the creative 
advances meaningful IP protection requires. Patent law, for example, demands 
as a prerequisite to protection that inventions be novel.149 As Greg Mandel has 
noted, the essence of the novelty requirement is “remarkably akin” to the 
novelty psychologists consider an essential element of creativity.150 Copyright, 
too, requires that expressive works be “original” to merit protection.151 As the 
Supreme Court put it in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., this 
is the “bedrock principle of copyright” law;152 any work seeking protection must 
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thus display “at least some minimal degree of creativity.”153 If creativity is 
required for IP protection, that which harms one’s ability to be creative will also 
harm one’s ability to participate in IP. And poverty harms one’s ability to be 
creative.154  
It is true that copyright’s originality requirement sets a notoriously low bar 
for what counts as creativity.155 Poverty’s destructive influence on creativity 
might therefore not systematically interfere with people’s ability to meet this 
minimal standard. But in this regard, it’s important to remember the claim that 
IP and distributive justice scholars are making. Not just that the poor can and 
should acquire and assert IP rights, but that the poor can and should acquire and 
assert IP rights that will help them financially and socially. In order for an IP-
protected expressive work to achieve this end, we might expect that the level of 
creativity required to generate the work would not only meet the originality bar, 
but substantially exceed it. For example, while poverty might not seriously 
interfere with a person’s ability to compose a straightforward email message, 
take a snapshot with his phone, or doodle on the back of an envelope—all 
copyrightable activities that in fact do acquire copyright protection at the 
moment of fixation156—it might very well interfere with that person’s ability to 
compose a more substantial piece of writing or music that has the potential to 
make him money and improve his social status. 
This is not to say that no one who is poor can ever be expected to engage in 
meaningful creative activity. That is clearly not the case; some of our most 
compelling works of literature, for example, have come from authors who were 
extremely poor;157 we have also already considered the cases of Oprah, J.K. 
Rowling, and Jan Koum.158 But what it does suggest is that the average person 
raised or living in poverty will be less able than the average person of means to 
convert a similar level of motivation and talent into creative output.  
If this is true, the argument that IP can help advance distributive goals where 
other social structures have failed159 loses much of its power. Indeed, while 
some few economically disadvantaged individuals may be able to harness IP to 
their advantage, we would expect IP, on the whole, to exacerbate existing 
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inequalities, as those of greater means are disproportionately able to participate 
in it and reap its benefits. 
Moreover, the challenge the psychology of poverty presents to the IP and 
distributive justice narrative is existential in the sense that it, unlike some of the 
other incompatibilities between poverty and creativity that have been 
recognized, can not easily be remedied within IP itself. While we should 
certainly continue to address IP-based concerns like financial barriers to entry 
and doctrines that may make it more difficult for the poor to acquire and assert 
IP rights, this will not fix the incompatibility raised here. That’s because the 
problem is one of reduced creation by the poor rather than reduced protection 
for the poor. Once a poor person creates something, we can make sure IP is 
structured such that this person can gain and assert rights in her creation as easily 
as possible. But because IP is premised on creation,160 it is powerless to help the 
poor person who does not create—even if that person would be creating but-for 
their poverty. It is difficult to see, then, how IP can serve as a meaningful tool 
of distributive justice in this sense without the aid of outside interventions aimed 
at reducing poverty.  
The behavioral incompatibility between IP and poverty also highlights some 
of the dangers and unintended consequences of the IP and distributive justice 
account. While the narrative is a relatively innocuous and even commendable 
story of empowerment, below its surface lies an assumption: that the poor, 
generally speaking, can in fact engage in the creative pursuits IP rewards with 
the same ease as those of greater means and similar levels of talent and 
motivation. This false underlying assumption is dangerous because it 
perpetuates the myth of the meritocracy: that we live in a society where a given 
level of talent, motivation, and hard work will tend to lead to a given level of 
financial and social success, regardless of the starting point of the person 
possessed of those qualities.161 And though this is certainly not the intention of 
IP and distributive justice scholars, there is a sense in which their narrative puts 
the onus on the poor to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps (with the 
help of IP) and make something of their lives, without fully recognizing the 
psychological disadvantages they face relative to the rest of the population in 
their attempts to do so.162  
This type of thinking holds peril for those who happen to live in poverty as 
well as those who are lucky enough to not currently face that challenge. For 
those of us with greater means, the danger is obvious—we could begin to think 
that members of poor populations who do not create are simply not talented, 
hard-working, or motivated enough to do so, even though this could be far from 
the truth. This, in turn, could stymie the political will to enact more promising 
distributive justice reforms.163 But it is also a particularly harmful mode of 
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thought for those who do currently find themselves in dire financial straits. One 
study, for example, found that economically disadvantaged youth who buy into 
the meritocratic narrative of hard work are more likely to act out in their middle 
school years, as they “begin to blame themselves for problems they can’t 
control.”164 Because the empowerment mindset can so easily be distorted into a 
meritocratic mindset, it runs the risk of adding one more burden to the already 
heavily-weighted loads of the poor—the burden of falsely believing that they 
themselves are fully responsible for their failure to realize their creative 
ambitions.  
In this regard, the fact that some poor people actually do successfully 
manage to take advantage of IP to escape poverty can act as a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, as Hughes and Merges point out, these success stories 
can serve as important role models for others who aspire to similarly harness the 
power of IP in their own lives.165 On the other hand, it could lead to incorrect, 
and potentially harmful, generalizations. If we see that some have been able to 
transcend their disadvantaged circumstances with the help of IP, we might 
wrongly assume that this is a realistic option for others in like circumstances.166  
It seems, then, that a particular argument common to law and distributive 
justice scholars—that the poor can and should harness IP rights to their 
individual and collective advantage—while superficially compelling, has some 
significant limitations. Foremost, it fails to recognize the degree to which 
poverty is incompatible with creativity. Because of this, the poor, as a group, 
will be less able to benefit from IP than those of greater means. And because the 
problem is one of reduced creation rather than reduced protection, nothing we 
do within the IP system can hope to change this. Given this reality, the rhetoric 
of empowerment the argument employs is particularly dangerous, because it 
incorrectly assumes the poor can in fact take advantage of IP, and indirectly puts 
the blame on them when they don’t. 
Importantly, the analysis here focuses on two particular types of IP for 
which creativity is particularly relevant—copyright and patent. There are, of 
course, other forms of IP, including trademark protection in particular, for which 
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the distributive justice analysis might differ significantly. Trademark protection 
is available to signifiers, such as words or symbols,167 that designate the source 
of a good or service.168 Owners of trademarks acquire rights by using their 
marks in commerce to identify their products,169 and can prohibit uses of their 
mark (or similar marks) that might confuse consumers about a product’s 
source170 or dilute the uniqueness of the owners’ mark in consumers’ minds.171 
It’s generally thought that trademarks do not reward creativity;172 accordingly, 
there is no requirement for acquiring trademark protection akin to patent’s 
nonobviousness and novelty inquiries or copyright’s originality threshold. 
Because of this, the negative influence poverty exerts on creativity may not 
significantly interfere with the ability of those living in poverty to take 
advantage of trademark protection and the economic advantages it bestows. 
Indeed, one important strain of the IP and distributive justice literature focuses 
on how geographic indications—a form of trademark protection granted to 
products, like Rocquefort cheese or Idaho potatoes, that come from a particular 
geographic source—are a particularly useful way to put valuable IP rights in the 
hands of the poor.173  
The discussion here also centers on the effects poverty wields on the 
individual, and does not speak to how poverty may or may not influence a 
community’s collective ability to innovate. This is significant because another 
avenue scholars have proposed for putting IP in the hands of the poor is through 
the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expression—innovations 
like traditional music and stories or therapeutic and horticultural technologies 
that arise in particular communities and cannot be traced to a single 
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individual.174 Further research would be needed to determine to what extent 
poverty impacts communities’ ability to produce these forms of knowledge. But 
insofar as these forms of knowledge have been produced, it is certainly 
consistent with a distributive agenda, and not contrary to my conclusions here, 
to grant them some form of IP protection. 
Finally, to be clear, the conclusion that the poor may not easily be able to 
harness IP rights to their individual and collective advantage does not disrupt 
other important strands of the IP and distributive justice literature. Much of this 
literature, for instance, is concerned with how IP can advance distributive justice 
by increasing public access to IP-protected goods and services.175 Because this 
goal does not depend on the ability of the poor to create and obtain IP rights 
over their own creations, nothing discussed here calls into question either the 
feasibility or the desirability of this endeavor. Nor does it mean that for those 
living in poverty who do manage to create IP-protectable content, we shouldn’t 
try to make it as easy as possible, through changes to IP doctrine and procedure 
others have proposed,176 for them to acquire and assert IP rights. But we should 
be aware that these situations may be the exception, rather than the norm.  
B. Explaining IP’s Observed Inequalities (and What it Means for 
Incentive Theory)  
The psychological incompatibility between poverty and creativity throws 
into question the assertion that IP can serve as a meaningful tool of distributive 
justice by giving the poor opportunities to enhance their social and financial 
positions. But it may also help explain the reality we actually see on the ground. 
Because in fact, from the limited data that has been collected to date, it does 
appear that the poor and other disadvantaged groups are acquiring IP rights at 
much lower rates than their more advantaged counterparts.177 And although IP 
and distributive justice scholars’ argument does not wholly depend on 
ownership of IP rights—Hughes and Merges argue, for example, that simply 
participating in IP by working in IP-dominated fields benefits authors 
economically and socially regardless of whether they end up owning the 
resulting IP rights178—IP ownership is one important indicator of the extent to 
which particular groups are, in fact, participating in IP.  
                                                                                                                     
 174 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 46, at 1216–20. 
 175 See, e.g., Fisher & Syed, supra note 43, at 583 (proposing a prize regime to improve 
access to pharmaceuticals in developing countries); Lee, supra note 43, at 925 (highlighting 
“various ‘accommodation strategies’ for integrating distributive values in an innovation 
system fundamentally predicated on profit maximization”); Shaver, supra note 43, at 122 
(discussing how IP limits access among poorer populations to copyrighted works). 
 176 E.g., Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 561–75; Lee, supra note 4, at 347–52, 363–
67. 
 177 See Bell et al., supra note 17, at 650.  
 178 Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 533–36. But see Greene, supra note 76, at 370–
72 (arguing that racial minority artists are taken advantage of in contractual negotiations). 
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In this regard, the most direct measurement of IP participation among the 
poor comes from Raj Chetty and colleagues’ recent study on innovation and 
opportunity in America.179 The study finds, among other things, that children 
from the top 1% of families by income are ten times more likely than children 
from below-median families to go on to apply for or receive a patent.180 While 
some of this difference can be predicted by mathematic proficiency,181 math 
scores account for only a third of the total innovation gap between rich and 
poor.182 In fact, so much of the difference is unrelated to a talent for math that a 
poor child with strong math skills is less likely to hold a patent than a rich child 
with inferior math ability.183 
Consistent with this finding, Colleen Chien recently reported that IP rights 
tend to be increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small and elite group.184 
Over half of new patents granted in 2016 went to the top one percent of patent 
owners, up from just under forty percent of patents going to the top one percent 
in 1986.185  
And though the following data do not speak directly to the link between 
poverty and IP, it appears that other minority groups—many of whom tend to 
cluster at the low end of the U.S. income distribution186—are also 
underrepresented in the U.S. patent and copyright systems. In their demographic 
evaluation of patent owners, for instance, Chetty and colleagues found that the 
white children in their sample were over three times more likely to go on to 
apply for or get a patent than the black children, and eight times more likely to 
                                                                                                                     
 179 See generally Bell et al., supra note 17 (explaining that “there are many ‘lost 
Einsteins’—individuals who would have had highly impactful inventions had they been 
exposed to innovation in childhood—especially among women, minorities, and children 
from low-income families”). 
 180 Id. at 649. 
 181 Id. at 650 (finding that third grade math test scores help predict later patenting 
behavior). 
 182 Id. The predictive power of math scores grows over time; by the eighth grade, these 
scores predict about half of the innovation gap between rich and poor children. Id. But as the 
study’s authors point out, this is also consistent with the hypothesis that test scores for poor 
children worsen over time, suggesting that environmental factors may be causing the poorer 
children to fall further behind their richer counterparts as time goes on. Id.  
 183 See Bell et al., supra note 17, at 672–73 fig.IV (showing that there are fewer future 
inventors in a group of low-income children with a 0.5 standardized test score than there are 
in the group of high income children with a -0.5 standardized test score).  
 184 Colleen Chien, Inequality, Innovation, and Patents 39–40 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal 
Studies Research Papers Series, No. 2018-03), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3157983 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
 185 Id.  
 186 See, e.g., African American Income, BLACK DEMOGRAPHICS, https://blackdemo 
graphics.com/households/african-american-income/ [https://perma.cc/PUM2-YRQ3] 
(using 2016 U.S. Census Bureau data to report that 46% of African Americans in the United 
States have annual household incomes below $35,000); Pressman, supra note 69 (reporting 
that “minorities had higher poverty rates than non-Hispanic whites, mainly 
because . . . minorities receive lower wages on average than whites”).  
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do so than the Hispanic children in their sample.187 On the copyright front, Bob 
Brauneis and Dotan Oliar found that white copyright holders are 
overrepresented in copyright registrations,188 while Hispanic, Asian and Pacific 
Islanders, American Indians, and individuals of multiple races are 
underrepresented.189 Women are also underrepresented compared to men in 
both patent and copyright ownership.190 
These findings are concerning, and not only from a distributive justice 
perspective. The dominant view in the IP literature is that IP is about optimizing 
socially beneficial innovation. Though it is difficult to know what the “optimal” 
level of innovation is and where we currently reside in relation to that goal, the 
fact that certain identifiable groups seem to be innovating at lower levels than 
others—at least as measured by IP ownership191—raises the possibility that we 
are falling short of optimality, in one of two ways. 
First, we could be falling short of optimality in terms of sheer numbers of 
innovations. For example, if we assume that IP is doing its job well with respect 
to well-off white males—the best represented group in patent and 
                                                                                                                     
 187 See Bell et al., supra note 17, at 666. 
 188 Robert Brauneis & Dotan Oliar, An Empirical Study of the Race, Ethnicity, Gender, 
and Age of Copyright Registrants, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 46, 59–60 (2018). 
 189 Id. at 60–61. Hispanics produced only 45% of the copyrighted works they would 
have if their participation in the copyright system mirrored their representation in the general 
population. Id. at 60. The same figure was 83% for Asian and Pacific Islanders, 77% for 
American Indians and Alaska natives, and 62% for people of multiple races. Id. at 61. For 
comparison, whites produced 116% of the copyrighted works expected based on their 
proportion of the population. Id. Unlike with patents, black owners are also overrepresented 
in the copyright system, producing 120% of the copyrighted works expected based on their 
proportion of the population. Id. 
 190 Kyle Jensen et al., Gender Differences in Obtaining and Maintaining Patent Rights, 
36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 307, 307 (2018) [hereinafter Jensen et al., Gender Differences 
in Obtaining and Maintaining Patent Rights]; see also Bell et al., supra note 17, at 668 
(finding that, of a cohort born in 1980, only eighteen percent of the inventors—defined as 
those who applied for or received a patent in their lifetimes—in the sample were women); 
Brauneis & Oliar, supra note 188, at 73 (finding that men represent two-thirds of copyright 
owners, despite comprising only half of the population and just over half of the labor force); 
Dan L. Burk, Diversity Levers, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 25, 31 (2015) (summarizing 
various empirical results and concluding that “women are at every level pervasively absent 
from the patent system”); Kyle Jensen et al., Why Do Women Inventors Win Fewer Patents?, 
YALE INSIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2018), https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/why-do-women-
inventors-win-fewer-patents [https://perma.cc/R4CQ-D3DB] (finding that only ten percent 
of inventors listed on patents are women, although women represent half the U.S. population 
and earn half of the science and engineering PhDs). 
 191 IP participation is an admittedly imperfect proxy for innovation. See, e.g., Bell et al., 
supra note 17, at 649 n.2 (citing Griliches and discussing the limitations of using patents as 
a proxy for innovation, including the fact that not all inventions are patented). See generally 
Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
1661 (1990) (discussing in detail the use of patents as a proxy for innovation). 
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copyright192—by encouraging them to innovate at optimal levels, then the lower 
participation rates among other groups might signal that IP is not doing its job 
so well with these populations, resulting in sub-optimal levels of innovation 
overall. Of course, another possibility is that IP is actually over-incentivizing 
wealthy white males.193 If this is the case, this surplus innovation may 
compensate for the deficit of IP-protected innovation from minority groups, 
resulting in optimal levels of innovation overall. 
But even if this latter scenario is indeed what’s going on, we may be falling 
short of optimality on another metric—the types of innovations being produced. 
Presumably the optimal slate of innovations is one that includes a variety of 
artistic and scientific works in different media and from different fields of 
endeavor. Brauneis and Oliar, however (for example), find that different 
demographic groups tend to register different types of copyrightable works.194 
Registration is only a proxy for actual creation,195 and some of these differences 
might reflect barriers to entry for certain groups rather than differences in 
interest. But we might still hypothesize that relying disproportionally on 
particular demographic groups for our innovation may result in insufficiently 
                                                                                                                     
 192 With one exception—according to Brauneis and Oliar—black authors are 
overrepresented in the copyright system, and slightly more so than white authors (while 
white authors accounted for 74% of the registrations in 2010, though they represented only 
63.7% of the population that same year—a ratio of 1.16, black authors accounted for 15% of 
registrations in 2010 though they comprised only 12.6% of the population—a ratio of 1.19). 
Brauneis & Oliar, supra note 188, at 59–62. The participation of African Americans in the 
copyright system has sparked some scholarly interest. While Brauneis and Oliar’s number 
suggests that African Americans, as a group, are reaping the advantages of copyright, some 
scholars have pointed out that this is a relatively new development. See, e.g., Greene, supra 
note 76, at 370 (“[F]or a long period of U.S. history, the work of black blues artists was 
essentially dedicated to the public domain.”). K.J. Greene has also argued that even when 
black artists are granted copyrights in their works, they might not receive adequate 
compensation due to copyright divestment and inequitable contracts that strip them of the 
lion’s share of their earnings. Id. On the other hand, Justin Hughes and Robert Merges have 
recently compiled empirical data suggesting that the copyright system is responsible for 
creating the wealth of the richest African Americans. Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 
549. Based on these findings, they argue that “copyright in its current form is a powerful tool 
to empower creative individuals [including African Americans and other minorities] 
economically.” Id. at 516. 
 193 See LUNNEY, supra note 21, at 14 (explaining that under the incentive theory of IP, 
“suboptimal production does not refer to too few [new innovations] in some general ‘more 
is better’ sense, but to th[e] precise economic relationship” wherein “the (fully internalized) 
marginal social value of an additional [innovation] precisely equals its marginal social cost”). 
Lunney explores an economic model according to which the market, even in the absence of 
copyright protection, leads to the over-production of musical works. See id. at 37. 
 194 Brauneis & Oliar, supra note 188, at 57–72, 75–78 (examining trends in types of 
registered works by race and gender).  
 195 See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 17, at 649 n.2 (citing Griliches and discussing the 
limitations of using patents as a proxy for innovation, including the fact that not all inventions 
are patented). See generally Griliches, supra note 191 (discussing in detail the use of patents 
as a proxy for innovation). 
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varied output—both in terms of the types of works being created, and in the 
content of those works, as the substance of innovative works generally reflects 
the individual backgrounds and experiences of their creators.196  
If the lower rates of IP ownership in poor and minority populations are 
indeed a signal of sub-optimality in either number or variety of innovations, then 
specific social harms follow. On the numbers side, if we are failing to achieve 
the optimal level of innovation, society is missing out on the collective benefits 
these creations would have brought—benefits like access to new products, 
books, songs, and visual arts, technological advances, and the new jobs and 
growth that are spurred by them.197 The Chetty study estimates that if “women, 
minorities, and children from lower-income families were to invent at the same 
rate as white men from high-income (top-quintile) families, the total number of 
inventors in the economy would quadruple.”198 If the contributions of these 
groups are necessary to achieve optimal levels of innovation, this is a significant 
societal loss. And this is to say nothing of the personal economic losses 
involved, which will be borne primarily by the economically disadvantaged.199  
On the variety side, a sub-optimal assortment of innovations deprives 
society of the full range of human ingenuity. And there may be less obvious 
harms as well. Exposure to multicultural literature, for example, reduces 
prejudice and helps children develop empathy for members of races other than 
                                                                                                                     
 196 See Brauneis & Oliar, supra note 188, at 92 (“We believe that people bring something 
from themselves into their creativity, and that the authorship scene would integrate more 
insights, cater to more tastes, and generally be better and more interesting if a broader variety 
of people were involved in cultural production . . . .”). 
 197 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 190, at 33 (citing Jennifer Hunt et al., Why Don’t Women 
Patent? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17888, 2012) for the 
proposition that the innovation gap between men and women alone represents a per capita 
GDP loss of 2.7%). 
 198 Bell et al., supra note 17, at 653. 
 199 The burden will be borne primarily by disadvantaged groups because, as IP and 
distributive justice scholars have recognized, IP rights often translate into valuable financial 
gains for their owners. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, empirical evidence suggests that this 
is true even for patents and copyrights owned by individual inventors and artists rather than 
by large companies. See Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent 
Portfolios through Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 485–
86 (2007) (valuing issued patents using an analytical valuation model and finding, 
unexpectedly, that unassigned patents—i.e., those owned by their inventors and not assigned 
to an employer or company—were the fourth-most valuable category of patents analyzed); 
Hughes & Merges, supra note 7, at 529 (arguing that that “copyright [has] a positive impact 
on the income of individual citizens,” via direct returns from individually owned copyrights 
or, in some case, through increased income as a reward for producing copyrighted works-
for-hire for employers). If the economically disadvantaged are not acquiring or contributing 
to IP rights at the same rate as their peers, this puts them—as a group and as individuals—at 
an even greater financial disadvantage. This is particularly true given that IP rights are, in 
effect, a transfer of public wealth to private individuals. If, as the empirical evidence 
suggests, this transfer disproportionately benefits people who are already wealthy, it serves 
to compound existing economic inequalities. 
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their own200—if such literature is produced at sub-optimal levels, we are 
forgoing wide-ranging benefits we might have otherwise reaped. Societal harms 
aside, the individuals who would be creating but-for their poverty are also 
harmed in personal ways that go beyond the financial.201 
This discussion of optimality assumes that IP ownership is a reasonable 
proxy for innovation more broadly,202 so that we can indeed conclude from the 
data cited that members of poor and other minority groups are innovating at 
lower levels than their more advantaged counterparts. Though I believe this 
conclusion is essentially correct, there is certainly more to the story. 
Specifically, the data cited might underestimate the degree to which the poor are 
innovating, for a number of reasons. The poor may be less likely to seek out IP 
rights in their creations due to financial203 or structural204 barriers. They may be 
denied IP rights at higher levels due to bias,205 or because IP doctrines and 
                                                                                                                     
 200 Timothy Coon, How Does Exposure to Multicultural Literature Benefit Children’s 
Thought Processes About Race? (Aug. 2012) (unpublished M.S. thesis, St. John Fisher 
College) (on file with Fisher Digital Publications, St. John Fisher College).  
 201 One of the non-economic rationales for granting IP rights, for example, proposes that 
people create to express themselves as human beings and therefore have a personality-based 
interest in their creations. E.g., Fromer, supra note 34, at 1753; Hughes, supra note 35, at 
330; MERGES, supra note 2, at 68–100; Radin, supra note 35, at 971–78. If people who could 
and would be expressing themselves creatively but for their financial status are not doing so, 
this arguably impoverishes their lives in ways that lowered financial gains and social status 
don’t fully capture. 
 202 See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 17, at 649 n.2 (citing Griliches and discussing the 
limitations of using patents as a proxy for innovation, including the fact that not all inventions 
are patented). See generally Griliches, supra note 191 (discussing in detail the use of patents 
as a proxy for innovation). 
 203 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 75 (listing the copyright registration fee as 
$55); Quinn, supra note 75 (estimating that it would cost a small entity a minimum of $1210 
in application and issuance fees to successfully apply for and issue a nonprovisional utility 
patent); Treece, supra note 75 (estimating that the cost of successfully prosecuting a patent 
with an attorney’s help ranges from a minimum of $5000 to about $15,000 for a more 
complex patent). 
 204 Those at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale may lack personal familiarity with 
the IP system, and they are also probably less likely to have people in their social networks 
with this familiarity. See Bell et al., supra note 17, at 651 (finding that exposure during 
childhood to other inventors makes it more likely that a child will himself go on to become 
an inventor); Greene, supra note 74, at 353–54 (explaining how the 1909 Copyright Act’s 
complex registration requirements may have prevented black artists historically from getting 
protection for their work); Sunder, supra note 3, at 273 (“[P]roblems encountered in 
protecting the knowledge of the poor [may] turn . . . on the poor’s lack of knowledge of their 
rights . . . .”).  
 205 See, e.g., Jensen et al., Gender Differences in Obtaining and Maintaining Patent 
Rights, supra note 190, at 309 (finding that women inventors with names that made it 
difficult to identify their gender were more likely to have a patent application accepted as 
compared to women with names that easily identified them as female). 
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concepts entrench certain assumptions about how innovation should proceed.206 
Or they may disproportionately choose to innovate in areas that are not IP-
protectable.207  
Nevertheless, the conclusion we can draw from the data—that there is an 
innovation gap, or at least an IP gap, between rich and poor—is consistent with 
the psychological incompatibility between poverty and creativity. Indeed, the 
psychological profile of poverty provides an additional, novel explanation for 
these data: it tells us that it is not just bias, or financial barriers, or innovation 
outside IP, that is causing us to see the disparities we do. Something else is going 
on, and that something may be happening at the level of creative decision-
making. This is significant because a full understanding of the IP/innovation gap 
can help us decide what will work—and what won’t—as we attempt to address 
it.  
                                                                                                                     
 206 Dan L. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 881, 
889–903 (2011) (discussing the ways in which intellectual property doctrines might 
unintentionally perpetuate common gender biases); see also Burk, supra note 190, at 30–31 
(arguing that stereotypical “rational” and “analytical” male approaches to problem solving, 
as opposed to more stereotypically female “emotive” or “intuitive” problem solving 
methods, “are more amenable to satisfaction of the teaching and disclosure requirements of 
patent law as currently formulated”). 
 207 For example, Peter Lee writes of “social innovation”: “novel creations that serve 
social needs,” but fall outside the bounds of patent protection. Peter Lee, Social Innovation, 
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014). It is possible that social innovation disproportionately 
attracts members of certain demographic groups. According to Lee, for example, social 
innovation tends to be pluralistic and “arise collaboratively from communities.” Id. at 28. 
There is some evidence that collaboration is a particular strength of women, on average, as 
compared to men. See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Mary C. Johannesen-Schmidt, The Leadership 
Styles of Women and Men, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 781, 782, 790 (2001) (discussing previous 
research suggesting that women have more collaborative leadership styles than men, but 
suggesting that this could be due in part to social expectations and internalized gender 
stereotypes about how women should behave in the workplace); Public Release, Univ. of 
Toronto, Women More Collaborative in Workteams: Study (Apr. 19, 2005), https:// 
www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2005-04/uot-tms041905.php [https://perma.cc/XL 
7U-D5FX] (reporting on research by Jennifer Berdhal finding that teams with woman 
leaders tended to become more egalitarian over time, while those with male leaders retained 
a hierarchical structure with the leader at the center. Interestingly, the more egalitarian teams 
also performed better as judged by outsiders). And some of the social innovations Lee 
describes, like microfinance, are explicitly designed to help poor and minority communities. 
Lee, supra note 207, at 20 (“[T]he efforts of [microfinance institutions] are explicitly 
distributive; [one such entity] targets the poor and overwhelmingly lends to women, who 
comprise ninety-seven percent of borrowers.”). These fields may be particularly attractive to 
members of these communities who are looking for an outlet for their creative talents. See 
Sunder, supra note 3, at 290 (discussing how the DevNat licensing regime, originally 
formulated as a way for creators in the developed world to provide access to their creations 
in the developing world, has also been embraced by creators within the developing world as 
a way to support their own communities). 
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C. Beyond Incentives 
Whether you subscribe to the dominant view that IP should focus primarily 
on the goal of maximizing socially beneficial innovation, or you believe that IP 
should also be cognizant of distributive concerns, the evidence that poverty 
interferes with creative decision-making should change the way you think about 
how to best achieve each of these goals.  
As explored in the last section, one important takeaway for the efficiency 
camp is that poverty may be contributing to a suboptimal supply (in amount or 
variety) of innovation. This has implications for how IP scholars tend to think 
about innovation and how best to promote it. 
Consistent with the utilitarian narrative that we need incentives designed to 
combat intellectual goods’ free-rider problem to encourage potential innovators 
to create,208 much of the current IP and innovation scholarship focuses on these 
incentives. For example, scholars often ask whether current IP doctrines provide 
the appropriate level of incentives, wherein the benefits reaped from more 
innovation outweigh the deadweight losses IP incurs.209 Or whether there are 
other, better, ways to provide individuals with these incentives—like grants,210 
or prizes,211 or tax breaks,212 or social norms.213 The underlying, unstated 
                                                                                                                     
 208 See supra Part I. 
 209 See, e.g., LUNNEY, supra note 21 (arguing that the copyright system currently offers 
excessive levels of protection to musical works, with attendant costs that outweigh the 
benefits of increased number and quality of works); Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based 
Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1338–44 (2015) (arguing that we should grant 
IP rights only to the extent necessary to optimize innovation); Olson, supra note 24 
(analyzing patentable subject matter doctrine in light of the utilitarian rationale for patents).  
 210 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 
57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1719–24 (2008) (discussing the relative benefits and costs of government 
grants as research incentives as compared to patents). 
 211 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 
176–77 (2003) (proposing a market-based prize system); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing 
Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 
11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124–25 (1997) (same); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, 
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 526–27 (2001) 
(reviewing the literature debating the relative merits of patents versus prizes). 
 212 See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patent-Prizes 
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (arguing that tax incentives may be a superior incentive 
mechanism for the production of intellectual products); Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent Nationally, 
Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301 (2016) (arguing that state-funded tax and 
other incentives might prove to be a superior mechanism for funding innovation). 
 213 See, e.g., Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski, Introduction to CREATIVITY WITHOUT 
LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 2 (Kate Darling & 
Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017) (arguing that IP law has “historically disregarded non-legal 
regulatory tools that enable more granular, and potentially more effective, management of 
creative incentives”); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 20, at 1832 (“None of the foundational 
theoretical studies (as distinguished from recent studies in IP law that focus on particular 
creative communities) meaningfully acknowledges the possibility that social norms can 
provide incentives to create.”); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, When Are IP 
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assumption is that if we get incentives right, the optimal level of innovation 
should follow.214 
What often gets overlooked in the discussion of incentives, however, is the 
possibility that there are potential innovators—those with the necessary talent 
and motivation to create—whose circumstances may prevent them from 
responding to optimal incentives in the expected way, or even at all. These 
circumstances may be embedded in their innovation environments, which may 
give rise either to “innovation dilemmas” of various kinds215 or 
counterproductive social norms that lead to sub-optimal decision-making about 
which avenues of research to pursue.216 Or, like here, they may be broader life 
circumstances that make it difficult for potential innovators to think creatively 
at all. Whatever the precise situation, the point is that creators are people living 
in complex environments, and ostensibly extraneous social and psychological 
forces in their lives will impact their ability to respond to even the most well-
designed innovation incentives.  
What should innovation scholars do about this? First, to the extent they can 
identify these social and psychological forces, they should. This will help them 
determine whether they can actually expect individuals to respond to the 
innovation incentives provided. In doing so, they may find large, identifiable 
groups of people—in this case, the poor—who may not be responding to 
innovation incentives as expected for reasons that have little to do with the 
quality of the incentives themselves.  
Second, once scholars have identified forces that may be interfering with 
the ability to respond to innovation incentives, they can ask whether they can do 
anything to address and counter these forces, and whether they can expect these 
interventions to promote innovation in socially beneficial ways. This line of 
inquiry should prompt innovation scholars to move beyond the incentives-for-
innovation paradigm and begin thinking much more broadly about innovation 
and how to promote it.  
It is an especially timely moment to do so, given that scholars have begun 
to question whether innovation indeed flows from incentive in the simple 
manner so often presumed. Despite the prevalence of the canonical incentive 
                                                                                                                     
Rights Necessary?: Evidence from Innovation in IP’s Negative Space, in 1 RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THEORY 309, 314 (Ben 
Depoorter & Peter Menell eds., 2019) (“Many negative space studies have documented the 
powerful role social norms play in stimulating innovation and constraining appropriation.”). 
 214 See Ouellette, supra note 18, at 66–67 (framing the question for innovation scholars 
as whether “patents provide a net innovation incentive,” or whether, alternatively, 
“other . . . incentives [are] superior”). 
 215 Brett M. Frischmann et al., Conclusion to GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 469, 
471–72 (Brett M. Frischmann et al. eds., 2014) (identifying a number of “innovation 
dilemmas” that confront potential innovators, including infrastructure problems and 
coordination challenges among research groups). 
 216 Stephanie Plamondon Bair & Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Anti-Innovation Norms, 112 
NW. L. REV. 1069, 1091–95 (2018) (describing how informal rules growing from social 
forces and psychological biases that may lead creators down suboptimal innovative paths). 
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story in IP, the empirical evidence for this account is, at best, inconclusive.217 
For example, in a recent empirical study of copyright’s effect on the music 
industry, Glynn Lunney concluded that more copyright revenue “did not lead to 
more and better music,” as the incentives for innovation paradigm would 
predict.218 In fact, it led to less high quality music output.219 Lunney explains 
this result by satisficing behaviors on the part of top artists: as the lion’s share 
of increased copyright revenue was funneled to a few top artists, these artists 
presumably felt little need to keep up a frenetic pace of music output, and their 
productivity dropped.220 Lunney’s conclusion that the psychological 
phenomenon of satisficing adds complexity to the incentives-for-innovation 
paradigm is consistent with a growing realization that social and behavioral 
realities may disrupt this paradigm in various ways.221  
Given that a simple relationship between financial incentives and 
innovation output has been called into question—and indeed, that incentives 
may not work at all for certain demographic groups—perhaps it is time to stop 
focusing exclusively on incentives, and to consider other, non-traditional 
innovation-promoting policy levers. In doing so, scholars might discover 
mechanisms that are superior in various ways to incentives. Indeed, some of 
these levers may be better able than IP or other financial incentives to achieve 
both distributive justice and innovative efficiency goals.  
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Promoting Innovation by Tackling Distributive Justice 
The relationship between poverty and creative thinking throws into question 
claims that IP can serve as a meaningful mechanism for distributive justice by 
giving the poor a tool to improve their economic and social situations.222 It also 
helps explain why we see lowered IP participation among the poor,223 and 
sounds a warning note to efficiency scholars who assume that getting innovation 
incentives right is the sole mandate of a robust innovation policy.224  
Considering these insights together, an interesting possibility presents 
itself—one that turns IP scholars’ current thinking about IP and distributive 
justice on its head. Rather than using IP as a mechanism for promoting 
                                                                                                                     
 217 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 209, at 1335 (“[W]e have gone out, collected the 
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empowerment and distributive justice in poor populations—a strategy that likely 
will not work on a large scale—policies more directly aimed at tackling 
distributive justice should not only be more successful at attaining this goal, but 
should also help promote innovation by increasing creative participation among 
currently underrepresented groups.  
The logic of this proposition is as follows. If the circumstance of poverty 
does indeed interfere with creative thinking, then there are some number of 
talented, motivated individuals currently living in poverty who but-for their 
poverty would be innovating. Policies designed to tackle poverty, if successful, 
should have positive spillover effects on innovation as those talented, motivated 
individuals—now freed from the cognitive demands poverty imposes—begin to 
put their creative talent and motivation to good use. Indeed, as Chetty estimates, 
these positive spillover effects might be quite substantial.225  
What might these interventions look like? To achieve the positive spillover 
effects on innovation, distributive justice measures that directly tackle the 
creativity-disrupting cognitive burdens poverty inflicts would seem to be the 
most promising.  
1. Universal Basic Income 
One such intervention that has received a lot of attention lately is the 
universal basic income (UBI).226 The basic idea behind a UBI is simple: the 
government provides each of its citizens with some minimum level of cash 
income—no strings attached.227 The manner in which the government might do 
this could take a number of forms, including through a progressive taxation 
system, or via simple cash payments.228 The UBI helps achieve a Rawlsian 
vision of distributive justice by ensuring that all citizens have at least the 
minimum amount of resources necessary for meaningful participation in 
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society.229 By directly easing the financial burdens of the poor, the UBI should 
also reduce the cognitive loads imposed by poverty, thereby freeing the minds 
of its beneficiaries to think in more creative ways.  
One question UBI scholars have asked is whether the UBI should be 
available to children as well as adult citizens.230 In terms of achieving positive 
spillover effects on innovation, making the UBI available to children would be 
ideal, because of the particularly harmful and long-lasting effects of poverty on 
the creative thinking capacities of children.231 To the extent policymakers can 
prevent or mitigate these impacts by directly ameliorating the financial 
condition of children, they should expect to reap correspondingly larger positive 
spillovers resulting from increased innovation and creative thinking throughout 
these children’s lifetimes.  
2. Access to Health Services 
There are other possibilities as well. Increasing access to affordable basic 
health services, through a government-funded single payer system or targeted 
improvements to the current market-based approach,232 would arguably help 
achieve distributive justice ends by ensuring that the poor are not 
disproportionately bearing the costs of health care in the U.S.233 But it should 
also have positive effects on innovation, via several mechanisms. First, by 
easing or removing the financial burden imposed on the poor in exchange for 
essential health services, health care reform would ease the cognitive load 
caused by preoccupations about how to pay for these services.234 Second, by 
increasing access to affordable health care, the poor should receive better care 
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than they are currently receiving,235 which in turn should affect their ability to 
think creatively. Ill health imposes its own physical and cognitive burdens 
independent of financial worries, and those who aren’t receiving basic health 
services may be less able to engage in creative pursuits. Indeed, the fact that 
poverty privileges non-creative habit-based decision-making over goal-based 
decision-making could be due in part to reduced health in poor populations.236 
Third, reduced access to maternal health care services is one of the hypothesized 
contributors to impaired brain development in poor children.237 Tackling this 
aspect of creativity impairment in children should help mitigate the negative 
effects poverty imposes on a child’s cognitive potential.  
UBI and health care reform might also have a somewhat different (but 
related) salutary effect on innovation. Some subset of the population might be 
willing to accept a fairly low standard of living if doing so allows them to pursue 
creative goals. Having access to a guaranteed minimum wage and basic health 
care services could help make the decision to pursue a creative life easier for 
those who might otherwise resign themselves to a profession that pays the bills, 
but does not offer the time or opportunity to innovate.238 And for those who 
have already committed to pursuing creative vocations, it could free up 
additional time to do so. One Australian scholar, for example, estimates that 
“most artists in Australia spend less than 50% of their time on their creative 
vocation;” the balance being expended on mundane work to meet their basic 
needs.239 Programs that provide for these basic needs would arguably improve 
the productivity of those in creative professions who spend significant time 
doing non-creative work in order to make ends meet.  
3. Other Possibilities 
Distributive justice scholars have proposed a number of additional policy 
interventions designed to achieve their ends. For example, in their article 
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arguing that copyright protection can serve distributive justice ends, Hughes and 
Merges acknowledge that other mechanisms may be superior to IP in this 
respect.240 Espousing a Rawlsian vision of distributive justice that requires at 
least equality of opportunity, if not equality of outcome,241 they cite to the 
potential of educational reforms designed to give “all children equal access to 
pre-school, kindergarten, K-12 education, sports programs, summer camps, 
music lessons, university, and the like.”242  
Equal access to education is doubtless an important component of achieving 
distributive justice. Indeed, uneven educational opportunities between the poor 
and the rich may help explain both why it is so difficult for poor children to 
escape poverty243 and why the former group appears to be innovating at lower 
levels than the latter.244  
But the psychology of poverty tells us that if we truly want to achieve 
distributive justice, education reform will not, on its own, suffice. Because 
poverty interferes with brain development and co-opts scarce cognitive 
resources,245 poor children will not be fully able to take advantage of even the 
best educational opportunities. To achieve true distributive justice—and to 
achieve maximum positive spillover effects on innovation—the underlying 
causes of this cognitive disruption should be addressed. In this respect, 
interventions that tackle poverty itself, and identified contributors to the 
physiological and psychological effects of poverty—like lower quality health 
care—have the most potential to eliminate barriers to distributive justice and 
increase participation in innovation.  
B. Thinking Beyond Incentives: Other Innovation-Promoting Policy 
Levers  
Of note for efficiency scholars is the fact that none of the policy 
interventions discussed to this point fit the standard incentive formulation where 
an individual or organization innovates (or shows that it will innovate) and 
receives some financial reward in return—a patent, a copyright, a prize, a grant, 
or a tax break. And yet scholars might expect these policies to have significant 
innovation-promoting effects.  
This conclusion opens up an intriguing possibility for innovation scholars: 
if programs and policies that don’t offer a direct incentive for innovation can 
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nevertheless have significant innovation-promoting effects, perhaps—
especially given that the incentive story of innovation is more complicated than 
is often assumed—they should be thinking about other ways to promote 
innovation that similarly don’t fit the traditional incentive-for-innovation 
model.  
What might some of these policies look like? As a first modest step, we 
might consider a more robust use of federal funds to finance artists and scientists 
without making these funds contingent on output. Currently, most federal 
science funding requires applicants to submit a grant proposal, which is peer-
reviewed and granted based on a number of criteria, including the expected 
significance of the work and the potential for completion.246 Senior researchers 
spend much of their time on these grant proposals, time that arguably could be 
better spent on more creative tasks.247 Administering these grant systems is also 
costly. One Canadian study estimated, for example, that it cost more to run a 
national grant system in 2007 than it would have to simply give every qualified 
researcher in the country a baseline grant of $30,000.248 Finally, a common 
observation among researchers is that the level of detail required to secure 
funding is such that the work is often substantially complete before the funding 
arrives.249 Scientists thus often use secured funds to finance their next 
exploratory project—a reality which is more in line with the concept of a 
noncontingent grant based on past productivity than with the current, expensive 
model of proving up a project’s worthiness. While some federal funding 
opportunities for artists are somewhat more open-ended,250 the arts too could 
perhaps benefit from funding models that are less focused on the traditional 
incentive model.251  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A growing number of scholars think that IP should serve distributive justice 
goals. While this is an attractive idea, it is not clear that IP is actually a good 
mechanism for doing so. This Article has argued that, in fact, IP is probably not 
the best way to achieve distributive justice, at least in the sense of providing the 
poor with opportunities to accumulate wealth and improve their social status.  
The reason lies partly in the psychology of poverty. Because poverty affects 
decision-making in ways that make creative thinking more difficult, IP seems 
to be inherently limited as a tool for escaping poverty. At the same time, 
expecting IP to be such a tool gives rise to its own set of evils, because it 
incorrectly assumes the poor can in fact take advantage of IP, and indirectly puts 
the blame on them when they don’t. 
These conclusions should be of interest not only to those who think of IP in 
distributive justice terms, but also to those who subscribe to IP’s more 
traditional, utilitarian accounts. The psychology of poverty helps us understand 
why current levels of innovation are suboptimal and highlights a potential 
failure of the incentive model of innovation production. A solution to this failure 
is to start thinking beyond the traditional incentives-for-innovation model when 
considering how best to maximize socially beneficial creation. Fortuitously, 
doing so should help us achieve distributive justice goals much more efficiently 
than IP ever could. 
